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INTRODUCTION 
The law, as Jerome Frank pointed out over 60 years ago, “is not a 
machine and the judges [are] not machine-tenders.”1 It is dealing with 
“human relations in their most complicated aspects. The whole confused, 
shifting helter-skelter of life parades before it.”2 Society often calls upon 
judges to find answers to questions never posed before, to balance a 
complex array of needs and interests, and to ensure that their answers fit 
within a recognized legal framework. This challenge is particularly 
evident in the rapidly changing landscape of medical law.3 These cases, 
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 1. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 120 (1949).  
 2. Id. at 6. 
 3. The rapid evolution of medicine is reflected in concerns with the rise of 
medical liability resulting in two Bills before Congress in 2017. The American 
Health Care Reform Act of 2017 (“HR 277”) and Protecting Access to Care Act 
(“HR 1215”). This Article centers on one aspect of this evolving landscape: “loss 
of chance.” 
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which are, by definition, unique both in circumstance and potential 
outcome, give rise to questions for which the answer is not clearly defined 
and the law is complex and uncertain.4 In reaching a decision, judges will 
exercise discretion to achieve an outcome that is “fair and just.”5 The 
exercise of discretion often introduces an element of flexibility, which is 
essential in these decisions. With flexibility, however, comes the potential 
for inconsistency, and with a high level of public scrutiny comes the 
requirement that the judges provide transparent reasons for the conclusions 
they reach; society expects these reasons to be consistent with accepted 
legal principles and may, despite the often fact-driven nature of the 
dispute, accord precedential value in subsequent disputes.6 
In reaching a decision in many of these difficult cases, the judge 
appeals to public policy to provide the foundation for the decision.7 The 
assertion of policy facilitates discretion and allows the judge to address 
issues outside the legal framework.8 Indeed, judicial appeals to policy are, 
according to Lord Steyn, an “everyday occurrence.”9 Yet, policy has been 
described as “one of the most under-analysed terms in the modern legal 
lexicon.”10 Judges poorly articulate the term “policy” in judgments, which 
becomes even more evident when both the majority and dissenting judges 
make appeals to public policy without defining or explaining the relevant 
policy—yet reach opposite conclusions.11 
                                                                                                             
 4. This Article analyzes three such cases in which the complexity and legal 
uncertainty divided the court. See Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (Austl.); 
Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (UK); Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (Austl.). 
 5. TONY BINGHAM, THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING 36 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2000). The full quote is as follows: “[I]f, being governed by no (clear) rule of law, 
its resolution depends on the individual judge’s assessment (within such 
boundaries as have been laid down) of what is fair and just to do in a particular 
case.” Id. 
 6. As this Article will demonstrate, some judges take specific steps to assert 
that the decision holds no precedential value and is confined to the specific facts 
before the court. 
 7. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS (W. Acad. Publ’g 2013). 
 8. This Article develops this argument. 
 9. ALAN PATERSON & CHRIS PATERSON, GUARDING THE GUARDIANS? 
TOWARDS AN INDEPENDENT, ACCOUNTABLE AND DIVERSE SENIOR JUDICIARY 15 
(2012), https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/40759/ [https://perma.cc/6HUJ-82NG] 
(quoting Lord Steyn, Deference: A Tangled Story, STUDY LIB (Nov. 25, 2004), 
https://studylib.net/doc/7904474/deference--a-tangled-story---the-constitutional- 
and-adminis [https://perma.cc/JUC9-5YJ6]). 
 10. Peter Cane, Another Failed Sterilisation, 120 L. Q. REV. 189, 191 (2004). 
 11. This Article details this argument in the discussion. 
2018] POLICY, PRINCIPLE, OR VALUES 399 
 
 
 
In cases in which the law does not provide a clear answer, legal 
principle frames judicial decision-making, but individual values underpin 
decisions that assert public policy. This Article explores the judicial 
process and establishes that the complex interplay of influences warrants 
acknowledgment. Furthermore, the Article argues that despite the retreat 
from the language of values, the language of policy and the values it 
represents are an important aspect of the application of the law, lending 
flexibility to the judicial decision-making process that would not be 
possible if judges were limited to consideration of strict and formulaic 
legal principle. In cases that require the exercise of judicial discretion, 
other extra-legal factors may influence the decision-making process. 
This Article aims to reveal the values underpinning judicial decisions 
in three cases and argues that the language of public policy is used to frame 
a decision based on judicial values.12 Without suggesting that the implicit 
role of values should become explicit, this Article seeks to explore and 
understand the role that such values may play. 
I. PERSONAL VALUES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Social psychologists and behavioral economists are increasingly 
interested in the process of decision-making. The work of Daniel Kahenman 
and Aaron Tversky brought subconscious psychological influences on 
decision-making to public attention.13 To date, however, limited studies 
exist on the psychological process of judicial decision-making. The studies 
that do exist suggest that despite being expert decisionmakers, in uncertain 
decisions, judges are subject to the same subconscious psychological 
influences and processes as any other educated decisionmakers.14 
The recognition of these psychological influences is not confined to 
abstract or theoretical discussion. Indeed, studies have shown that innate 
influences, such as personal values, play a role in legal decisions.15 In this 
context, the potential influence of subconscious factors raises questions 
regarding the transparency of judicial decisions. It was the presence of 
                                                                                                             
 12. See generally Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (Austl.); Chester v. 
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (UK); Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (Austl.). 
 13. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).  
 14. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2000). 
 15. Rachel J. Cahill‐O’Callaghan, The Influence of Personal Values on Legal 
Judgments, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 596 (2013). 
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these extra-legal influences that concerned Justice Michael Kirby in 
Chappel v. Hart when he quoted Lord Salmon: 
“In truth the conception in question [i.e. causation] is not 
susceptible of reduction to a satisfactory formula”. Similarly, in 
Alphacell Ltd v Woodward, Lord Salmon observed that causation is 
“essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered 
by ordinary common sense rather than by abstract metaphysical 
theory.” Yet, a losing party has a right to know why it has lost and 
should not have its objections brushed aside with a reference to 
“commonsense[,]” at best an uncertain guide involving “subjective, 
unexpressed and undefined extra-legal values” varying from one 
decision-maker to another.16 
In the same case, Justice Hayne suggested that judges should reveal the 
values underpinning judgments: “The description of the steps involved in 
that kind of process is difficult and is apt to mislead. Articulating the 
reasoning will sometimes appear to give undue emphasis to particular 
considerations. No doubt if policy and value judgments are made, they 
should be identified.”17 Values and value judgements within legal 
scholarship encompass a wide range of different concepts, including: 
morals; interests; pleasures; likes; preferences; duties; desires; wants; 
goals; needs; attractions; and other kinds of selective orientations. This 
Article is grounded in the psychological understandings of values and, as 
such, defines values within a psychological context. Milton Rokeach 
defined values as “enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct.”18  
Humans develop their personal values experience and act as a largely 
subconscious guide to decision-making.19 An individual may hold a wide 
range of values in high regard; it is the relative importance of the specific 
                                                                                                             
 16. Chappel, 195 CLR, ¶ 2 (Kirby J). 
 17. Id. ¶ 148 (Hayne J). 
 18. MILTON ROKEACH, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN VALUES: INDIVIDUAL AND 
SOCIETAL 160 (1979). 
 19. Steven Hitlin & Jane Allyn Piliavin, Values: Reviving a Dormant 
Concept, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 359 (2004); see also Norman T. Feather, Values, 
Valences, and Choice: The Influence of Perceived Attractiveness and Choice 
Alternatives, 68 J. PERS. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 1135 (1995). Gregory Maio argues that 
values operate at three levels: (1) the system level; (2) the level of specific abstract 
values and the beliefs and feelings toward it; and (3) the instantiation level, or the 
level at which the value is applied to a specific situation. Gregory R. Maio, Mental 
Representations of Social Values, 42 ADV. EXP. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 1 (2010). 
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values in relation to other values that is critical to decision-making, as 
opposed to the importance of a single value in isolation.20 Drawing on a 
model of personal values Professor Shalom H. Schwartz developed,21 one 
of the authors devised a content analysis method to identify values within 
legal judgments.22 The study revealed different personal values in judicial 
opinions, endorsing opposing positions in cases, which divided the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.23 Experimental evidence 
demonstrating a close link between personal values and legal decision-
making supported the link between legal judgments and values.24 
This Article examines the relationship between values and judicial 
reasoning centered on policy, focusing on three key cases at the interface 
of personal autonomy and medical practice. Within the reasoning of each 
case, the judge significantly draws on policy to reach his decision. This 
discussion highlights the values that underpin the “policy” decisions and 
demonstrate that judicial language may be consistent, but the personal 
drivers behind those decisions are as individual as the judges themselves. 
                                                                                                             
 20. Shalom H. Schwartz, Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and 
Contents of Human Values?, 50 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994); see also Bas 
Verplanken & Rob W. Holland, Motivated Decision Making: Effects of Activation 
and Self-Centrality of Values on Choices and Behavior, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (2002); Gian Vittorio Caprara, Shalom Schwartz, Cristina 
Capanna, Michele Vecchione & Claudio Barbaranelli, Personality and Politics: 
Values, Traits, and Political Choice, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2006); David Fritzsche 
& Effy Oz, Personal Values’ Influence on the Ethical Dimension of Decision 
Making, 75 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 335 (2007). 
 21. Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: 
Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, 25 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1992); see also Schwartz, supra note 20; 
Shalom H. Schwartz et  al., Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory 
of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement, 32 J. OF CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 519 (2001); Wolfgang Bilsky, Michael Janik & Shalom H. 
Schwartz, The Structural Organization of Human Values-Evidence from Three 
Rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), 42 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 
759 (2011). 
 22. Rachel J. Cahill‐O’Callaghan, Reframing the Judicial Diversity Debate: 
Personal Values and Tacit Diversity, 35 LEGAL STUD. 1 (2015). 
 23. Cahill‐O’Callaghan, supra note 15. 
 24. Id. 
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II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE SCHWARTZ MODEL OF VALUES 
Many models of values exist within legal and psychological 
literature.25 This Article draws on the model Professor Shalom Schwartz 
developed, which scholars have extensively used and—unlike many 
models of values—demonstrates how an individual’s values relate to her 
other values.26 Scholars have used the model extensively and validated it 
in psychological research worldwide.27 According to the Schwartz model, 
one can encompass all conserved values in ten overarching motivations: 
(1) stimulation, or excitement; (2) self-direction, including independence 
and freedom; (3) universalism, including social justice and equality; (4) 
benevolence; (5) conformity; (6) tradition; (7) security; (8) power; (9) 
achievement; and (10) hedonism, or personal pleasure.28 An individual can 
regard each value as important, but when one must reach a decision 
between conflicting values, the decisionmaker will support one value over 
another. For example, if one frames the discussion of detention orders as 
                                                                                                             
 25. See ROKEACH, supra note 18; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, TOWARD A MORAL 
THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE LAW 123–48 (1983); Leslie Bender, Changing the 
Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1989); Viv J. Shackleton & Ali H. Abbas, 
Work-related Values of Managers: A Test of the Hofstede Model, 21 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 1, 109–18 (1990); Heldi Li Feldman, Prudence, 
Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 
1431 (1998); Meg J. Rohan, A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct, 4 PERS. 
SOC’Y PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 255–77 (2000); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2006). 
 26. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values, supra note 
21; see also Elad Davidov et al., Bringing Values Back in: The Adequacy of the 
European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 countries, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 
3, 420–45 (2008). 
 27. See, e.g., Timothy A. Judge & Robert D. Bretz, Effect of Work Values on 
Job Choice Decisions, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 261 (1992); Lilach Sagiv & 
Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Priorities and Readiness for Out-Group Social 
Contact, 25 J. PERS. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 1 (1995); Tommy Garling, Value Priorities, 
Social Value Orientations and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 38 BRITISH J. 
SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 397 (1999); Sonia Roccas et al., The Big Five Personality 
Factors and Personal Values, 29 PERS. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. BULL. 789 (2002); Anat 
Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of 
Relations, 29 J. PERS. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 1207 (2003); Shalom H. Schwartz & 
Tammy Rubel, Sex Differences in Value Priorities: Cross-Cultural and 
Multimethod Studies, 89 J. PERS. SOC’Y PSYCHOL. 1010 (2005); Gian V. Caprara 
et al., Personality and Politics: Values, Traits and Political Choice, 27 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 1 (2006). 
 28. The model is described in detail in Schwartz, Universals in the Content 
and Structure of Values, supra note 21. 
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a value decision, in deciding to support detention orders, the decision 
maker is affirming values encompassed in security—national security—
over those encompassed in independence—freedom and liberty. 
The Schwartz theory broadly classifies values into two opposing 
dimensions.29 The first dimension contains conservative values, 
emphasising order, preservation of the past, and resistance to change. It 
includes values encompassed within tradition, conformity, and security, 
which are opposed to the values affirming openness to change and 
independence of thought, action, and readiness for change—such as self-
direction. The second dimension includes those values that promote self-
enhancement—achievement and power—and those embodied in concepts 
of self-transcendence, or subverting self-interests for the welfare and 
interests of others—universalism and benevolence.30 
In the context of judicial opinions, the author has used Schwartz’s 
value framework to develop a method of systematic content analysis.31 
Although not commonly used, scholars have used empirical content 
analysis to identify characteristics of judicial reasoning in tort law cases,32 
including a contribution to a greater understanding of policy.33 The content 
analysis is a systematic, rule-guided technique to analyze textual data, 
which provides an unobtrusive, replicable method to provide insight into 
complex text.34 The author used such content analysis coding framework 
to associate judicial statements with the values that the statements 
affirmed.35 For example, in Chappel v. Hart, Justice Hayne stated: “The 
law of negligence is intended to compensate those who are injured as a 
result of departures from standards of reasonable care. It is not intended to 
compensate those who have received reasonable care but who may not 
have had the best available care.”36 Thus, Justice Hayne recognized the 
importance of limiting the application of the law of negligence. Hayne’s 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id.  
 30. For further details on the relationship of values and the Schwartz model, 
see Schwartz, supra note 20. 
 31. Cahill-O’Callaghan, supra notes 15 and 22. 
 32. Kylie Burns, The Australian High Court and Social Facts: A Content 
Analysis Study, 40 FED. L. REV. 317 (2012). 
 33. ANDREW SERPELL, THE RECEPTION AND USE OF SOCIAL POLICY 
INFORMATION IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA (2006); Andrew Serpell, Social 
Policy Information: Recent Decisions of the High Court of Australia, 21 J. JUD. 
ADMIN. 109 (2011). 
 34. KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS 
METHODOLOGY (Sage Publ’ns 4th ed. 2019). 
 35. See Cahill-O’Callaghan, supra notes 15 and 22. 
 36. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, ¶ 139 (Hayne J) (Austl.). 
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statement presents an affirmation of social order, asserting the need to 
limit the obligations of the State and individuals, which value is 
encompassed within security, centering on the stability of society. It 
represents, therefore, an affirmation of the values encompassed within 
security.37 
In the aforementioned case, Justice Kirby also affirmed the importance 
of autonomy in the context of the legal duty to inform a patient of risks 
inherent in proposed medical treatment: “This is the duty which all health 
care professionals in the position of Dr Chappel must observe: the duty of 
informing patients about risks, answering their questions candidly and 
respecting their rights, including (where they so choose) to postpone 
medical procedures and to go elsewhere for treatment.”38 The value of 
autonomy is encompassed within self-direction values that promote 
independent thought and action.39 In affirming autonomy, therefore, 
Justice Kirby affirmed the values associated with self-direction. 
Universalism is a broad value defined as understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people. It encompasses 
values that emphasize the subordination of self for society as a whole.40 In 
the legal context, the value of universalism affirms social justice and the 
protection of the vulnerable. Justice Gummow affirmed this value when 
he stated, “It would, in the circumstances of the case, be unjust to absolve 
the medical practitioner from legal responsibility.”41 Lord Hope in Chester 
v. Afshar highlighted the importance of protecting the vulnerable patient: 
“It will have lost its ability to protect the patient and thus to fulfil the only 
purpose which brought it into existence.”42 In doing so, Lord Hope 
affirmed values encompassed within universalism. 
Tradition and conformity values share the goal of subordinating 
oneself to socially imposed expectations.43 In legal opinions, the values of 
tradition and conformity emphasize restraint, adherence to precedent, and 
the affirmation of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
                                                                                                             
 37. See id. ¶ 33.  
 38. Id. ¶ 95 (Hayne J). Given the conscious decision of the High Court to 
retreat from the language of “informed consent,” judges do not use the word 
“autonomy” in the judgments here. Rather the language focuses on the expression 
of autonomy—the right and ability to choose what medical treatment the doctor 
would provide. 
 39. See id. ¶ 33. 
 40. Shalom H. Schwartz, An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic 
Values, 2.1 ONLINE READINGS IN PSYCHOL. & CULTURE 11 (2012). 
 41. Chappel, 195 CLR 232, ¶ 81 (Gummow J). 
 42. Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, ¶ 87 (UK) (Lord Hope).  
 43. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 11. 
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Content analysis reveals the values that underpin legal judgments. 
Comparison of the values expression facilitates identification of similar 
and differing values priorities. It is these value priorities that serve to 
underpin the judgment and outcomes of cases. The central argument of 
this Article is that analysis of the value expression in cases that draw on 
the language of policy will reveal the values that underpin judicial policy 
decisions in the medical context. In doing so, it is possible to examine the 
association between the language of policy and values. 
III. SELECTION OF CASES AND METHODOLOGY 
Three cases heavily draw on policy in their reasonings and address the 
same difficult legal question of “loss of a chance.” Two of the decisions 
divided judicial opinion on the issues surrounding a doctor’s duty to warn 
patients of the risks inherent in proffered medical treatment: the Australian 
High Court heard Chappel v. Hart,44 and the United Kingdom Court of 
Appeal heard the subsequent case Chester v. Afshar, and considered the 
decision in Chappel.45 The third decision, Tabet v. Gett,46 revisited the 
question of the “loss of a chance” in the context of provision of medical 
treatment and rejected loss of a chance as having a role in the law of 
negligence. 
The authors subjected the cases to systematic value content analysis, 
coding statements that affirm values encompassed within the Schwartz 
value framework.47 The analysis facilitated the quantification of value 
statements both within individual judgments and combined judgments, 
allowing comparisons between individual judges and between judges 
supporting opposing positions.48 The authors present the data in graphic 
form, with the number of value statements expressed as a percentage of 
the total values in the judgments or case.  
In cases in which the outcome is uncertain, the application of the 
Schwartz model shows that judges introduce the concept of policy as a 
tool for the exercise of judicial discretion. In exercising discretion, the 
judge is reaching a decision between two equally valid arguments; 
personal values underpin this decision. 
                                                                                                             
 44. Chappel, 195 CLR 232. 
 45. Chester, 1 AC 134. 
 46. Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (Austl.). 
 47. Further details can be found in Cahill‐O’Callaghan, supra notes 15 and 22. 
 48. See infra Part IV. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The decision in Chappel49 centered on a surgeon’s negligent failure to 
warn, loss of a chance, and causation. Mrs. Hart underwent necessary 
surgery but no doctor warned her of the heightened risk of infection if her 
esophagus was perforated. Her condition was progressive, and there was 
no question that she would have undergone the surgery at some time. The 
risk of perforation and infection would have been present irrespective of 
the time at which Mrs. Hart had the surgery and who treated her.50 The 
claim, therefore, focused on the assertion that she would have delayed the 
surgery and sought the most experienced surgeon to perform it had 
someone adequately informed her of the risks. Thus, she argued that she 
lost the chance to have another surgeon perform the surgery at another 
time. The case divided the court 3–2, with five separate opinions.51 The 
majority—Justices Gaudron, Gummow, and Kirby—upheld the original 
damage award and identified a causal connection between the failure to 
warn and the claimant’s injury. Justices McHugh and Hayne dissented and 
suggested that the plaintiff would have been exposed to the class of risk 
regardless of the omission. 
The majority and dissenting opinions drew on both legal principle and 
policy to support their respective positions. For example, both Justices 
Gaudron and Gummow highlighted the duty to inform as a legal principle: 
Because the risk was a risk of physical injury, the duty was to 
inform her of that risk. And that particular duty was imposed 
because, in point of legal principle, it was sufficient, in the 
ordinary course of events, to avert the risk of physical injury 
which called it into existence. . . . 
 
In this way the submissions for Dr Chappel tended to divert 
attention from the central issue, namely whether there was 
adequate reason in logic or policy for refusing to regard the “but 
for” test as the cause of the injuries sustained by Mrs Hart, by the 
allurement of further cogitation upon the subject of “loss of a 
chance”.52 
                                                                                                             
 49. Chappel, 195 CLR, ¶¶ 1–6. 
 50. Id. ¶ 44 (McHugh J). 
 51. See generally id. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 10 (Gaudron J), 70 (Gummow J). 
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Likewise, the dissenting opinions used the language of policy and 
principle.53 Justice McHugh acknowledged the role of policy in the 
decision reached “[a]s a natural consequence of the rejection of the ‘but 
for’ test as the sole determinant of causation, the Court has refused to 
regard the concept of remoteness of damage as the appropriate mechanism 
for determining the extent to which policy considerations should limit the 
consequences of causation-in-fact.”54 Later in his judgment, he 
specifically appealed to principles of law:  
No principle of the law of contract or tort or of risk allocation 
requires the defendant to be liable for those risks of an activity or 
course of conduct that cannot be avoided or reduced by the 
exercise of reasonable care unless statute, contract or a duty 
otherwise imposed by law has made the defendant responsible for 
those risks.55 
 
Thus, both the majority and minority opinions used similar language, 
drawing on policy and legal principle to support their reasoning. 
In addition, both the majority and minority recognized the importance 
of values in their decisions, drawing an association between policy and 
values in legal decisions surrounding issues of causation: “However, the 
‘but for’ test is not a comprehensive and exclusive criterion, and the results 
which are yielded by its application properly may be tempered by the 
making of value judgments and the infusion of policy considerations.”56 
Indeed, Justice McHugh, supporting the minority position, similarly 
asserts an association between values and policy considerations: 
“Consequently, value judgments and policy as well as our ‘experience of 
the “constant conjunction” or “regular sequence” of pairs of events in 
nature’ are regarded as central to the common law’s conception of 
causation.”57 
The judges themselves, therefore, specifically identify the role of 
values, but package them in the language of policy, implying consistent 
sets of values and application of those values. The judgments, despite 
reaching opposing conclusions, draw on both policy and legal principles 
to support their positions and, in the process, highlight the link between 
policy and values. Thus, the question becomes whether the opposing 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28. 
 54. Id. ¶ 24 (McHugh J) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. ¶ 28 (McHugh J) (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. ¶ 62 (Gummow J). 
 57. Id. ¶ 24 (McHugh J) (emphasis added) (quoting H. L. A. HART & TONY 
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 14 (2d ed. 1985)). 
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judgments reflect opposing values. Empirical analysis of the judgments 
reveals a differential pattern of expression of the values in the judgments 
of the majority as compared to those supporting the minority position. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Value content analysis of the judgments supporting opposing positions in Chappel v. Hart 
(1998) 195 CLR 232. The values espoused by the majority are represented in the dark bars and 
expressed as a percentage of the overall number of value statements in the opinions of the majority. 
The values of the minority expressed as a percentage are represented in the light bars. 
 
Value content analysis reveals different value profiles for judgments 
written in support of the majority and those in support of the dissenting 
position. In the majority opinions, 73% of coded value statements 
represented values encompassed within self-direction, in the form of 
autonomy and judicial freedom, and universalism, which encompassed the 
principles of social justice and protection of the vulnerable.58 In contrast, 
the judgments in support of the minority59 position recognized the values 
encompassed in universalism and self-direction. In contrast to the majority 
judgments, however, over half of the coding reflected the opposing values 
encompassed within conformity, including preventing uncertainty in the 
law, conforming with rules, and security. 
                                                                                                             
 58. Although some coding of values was encompassed within tradition and 
conformity, these only represented one-fifth of the total coding. 
 59. The authors use the language of “minority” to represent a subset of 
dissenting opinions in which more than one justice adopts an opposing position 
to the majority.  
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The empirical analysis suggests that the majority decision reflected 
values encompassed in self-direction and universalism; in contrast, the 
minority espoused values encompassed within conformity and security.60 
Indeed, Justice Kirby emphasized this conflict in values, highlighting the 
tension between conforming to legal principles—conformity—and 
fairness—universalism: 
Where a breach of duty and loss are proved, it is natural enough 
for a court to feel reluctant to send the person harmed (in this case 
a patient) away empty handed. However, such reluctance must be 
overcome where legal principle requires it. It must be so not only 
out of fairness to the defendant but also because, otherwise, a false 
standard of liability will be fixed which may have undesirable 
professional and social consequences.61 
Notably, Justice Kirby was the most neutral in his value position, 
espousing values encompassed within both universalism and conformity—
preventing uncertainty in the law—representing 37% of his coding. This 
neutrality may reflect an element of indecision between the two positions 
and the values they represent. It appears that Justice Kirby cast the 
deciding vote, which may have been reflected in his reasoning: 
It is further illustrated by the division of opinions in this case: 
Gaudron J and Gummow J favouring the dismissal of the appeal; 
McHugh J and Hayne J being in favour of allowing it. I agree with 
the remarks of my colleagues that the case is a difficult one 
involving an unusual chain of events.62 
In Chappel, therefore, the judges recognized the potential influence of 
values mediated through policy on the decision reached.63 Value analysis 
of the collective judgments reveals tension between the values of the 
majority and minority; this tension is also evident in the individual 
judgments.64 Indeed, the analysis of values reveals the internal tensions 
between opposing values, and although the decision frames the final 
outcome in the language of neutrality and policy, the analysis divulges the 
intrinsic values that underpin the outcome. 
                                                                                                             
 60. See supra Fig. 1. 
 61. Chappel, 195 CLR, ¶ 93 (Kirby J). 
 62. Id. ¶ 88 (Kirby J). 
 63. See supra Fig. 1. 
 64. See supra Fig. 1. 
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A similar pattern of differential value expression was evident in the 
House of Lords case, Chester,65 which drew upon the reasoning in 
Chappel to decide whether a doctor’s failure to fully inform a patient of 
risks was sufficient to satisfy causation.66 Chester was also a divided 
judicial opinion, with Lords Walker, Hope, and Steyn endorsing the 
majority position, and Lords Bingham and Hoffman dissenting.67 Again, 
the reasoning evidenced a conflict between opposing values. 
 
 
Figure 2: Value content analysis of the opposing judgments in Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. 
The values the majority espoused are represented in the dark bars and expressed as percentage of the 
overall number of value statements in the opinions of the majority. The values of the minority 
expressed as a percentage are represented in the light bars. 
As in Chappel, the Chester majority espoused values encompassed 
within self-direction—autonomy—and universalism—social justice, 
equality, and protection of the vulnerable.68 Although judges expressed 
very few values in the dissenting opinions, the values they expressed were 
the opposing values encompassed in conservation, including conformity, 
security, and tradition.69 Lord Steyn highlighted the conflict between 
opposing values of self-direction and tradition, stating: “But they [facets 
of autonomy] must also be weighed against the undesirability of departing 
                                                                                                             
 65. Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (UK). 
 66. Id. ¶¶ 9, 22. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 1–10 (Lord Bingham), 28–36 (Lord Hoffman). 
 68. See supra Fig. 2. 
 69. See supra Fig. 2. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Chester v. Afshar
Majority
Minority
2018] POLICY, PRINCIPLE, OR VALUES 411 
 
 
 
from established principles of causation, except for good reasons. The 
collision of competing ideas poses a difficult question of law.”70 In his 
judgment, Lord Steyn also highlighted the conflict between the values of 
tradition and universalism, drawing on academic opinion to promote 
universalism to affirm a link with policy, by paraphrasing the work of 
Professor Honore, suggesting: “[H]e was also right to say that policy and 
corrective justice pull powerfully in favour of vindicating the patient’s 
right to know.”71 
The empirical analysis of these decisions suggests that despite the 
similar language of policy, different values that influence the decision the 
court reached underpin the judicial approaches to the complex issues the 
claimants raised. In both Chappel and Chester, the majority reached a 
decision in support of individual autonomy, espousing the values 
encompassed in both self-direction and universalism.72 In contrast, the 
dissenting opinions espoused values included in conservation, including 
tradition, conformity, and security.73 
Statements that reflect values are more frequently espoused in cases 
that divide judicial opinion, which is true of Chester and Chappel. Values 
are not limited, however, to decisions that divide opinion. Rather, values 
may play a role in decisions in which the bench is in accord and indicate 
situations in which the application of an established legal test does not 
immediately present an answer, invoking broader considerations, such as 
policy. A third case demonstrates such a situation: Tabet v. Gett.74 
In Tabet,75 the Australian High Court revisited the central issues 
presented in both Chester and Chappel, namely, loss of a chance and 
causation. Specifically, the Tabet court addressed whether recovery for 
loss of chance was available in personal injury cases.76 The High Court 
held that recovery for loss of a chance was not available, emphasizing that 
if it had been available, the balance in these kinds of cases would tip in 
favor of the plaintiffs, resulting in a significant impact on professional 
liability insurance and, consequentially, the healthcare system.77 The 
number of individual judgments reflected the significance of this decision; 
Gummow ACJ, Heydon, Crennan, and Keifel JJ all delivered individual 
                                                                                                             
 70. Chester, 1 AC 134, ¶ 20 (Lord Steyn). 
 71. Id. ¶ 22 (Lord Steyn). 
 72. See supra Fig. 2. 
 73. See supra Fig. 2. 
 74. Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 (Austl.). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. ¶ 13. 
 77. Id. ¶ 102. 
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judgments, with only Hayne and Bell JJ writing jointly.78 The graph below 
presents the values espoused in those judgments. 
 
 
Figure 3. Value content analysis of the consensus opinions in Tabet v. Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. 
Individual values are expressed as a percentage of the total values expressed in the judgments. 
Typically, cases in which judges reach a consensus decision do not 
have many opinions individual judges wrote or many statements that 
reflect values.79 Although reaching a consensus decision in Tabet, the 
justices delivered five opinions, encompassing 18 coded statements.80 The 
decision centered on the values encompassed in conformity with 
“preventing uncertainty in the law,” which represented 83% of the total 
coding.81 Indeed, despite the array of reasoning, the majority of the value 
coding of each of four of the judgments—Justices Heydon, Keifel, Hayne, 
Bell, and Gummow ACJ—was coded in conformity representing between 
64%—Gummow ACJ—and 100%—Keifel J—of the coding.82 Only 
Gummow ACJ espoused a need for flexibility in the law, which is 
encompassed within universalism; however, the expression of this value 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. ¶¶ 65–69. 
 79. Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan, Values in the Supreme Court: Decisions, 
Division and Diversity (forthcoming 2019). 
 80. See, e.g., Tabet, 240 CLR 537, ¶¶ 18, 59, 62, 68, 69, 98, 102, 111, 124, 
142, 145, 151, 152. 
 81. See supra Fig. 3. 
 82. The judgment of Justice Gummow had the highest level of value coding 
with nine coded statements in his written opinion. 
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was significantly less than the values encompassed in overarching 
motivation of conservation—conformity, tradition, and security. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Increasing evidence demonstrates that values play a role in “those cases 
in which the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent.”83 In such 
uncertain cases, values influence the judicial reasoning and decisions 
through the exercise of discretion. The question becomes whether this 
appeal to values is clearly set out in the judicial narrative or, alternatively, 
whether there is a linguistic veil thrown over the reasoning. It is evident that 
instead of openly acknowledging value-based considerations, the judiciary 
will cloak its discussion in appeals as public policy. This broad and 
somewhat uncertain term fails to lend clarity to the discussion and warrants 
careful consideration. Even values cloaked as policy may, however, have a 
critical role in such cases, opening the door to the exercise of judicial 
discretion. 
Thus, judges will sometimes refer to the underlying values, but are 
more likely to appeal to “policy” or “public policy”—terms that defy clear 
and specific definitions. “Policy” is a fluid concept, which the judiciary 
sometimes employs to meet a perceived need and that places the exercise 
of value judgments within an acceptable framework. 
In the context of complex medical decisions, there has been a consistent 
pattern of emphasizing the social utility of treatment. In Chester,84 the 
House of Lords emphatically addressed policy considerations, such as social 
utility and whether a plaintiff ought to recover at the expense of established 
causative principles. Tracking this language through earlier decisions,85 it is 
clear that policy has played an overt role, but as illustrated above, values sit 
at the base of these policy discussions and underpin the decisions. In the 
foundational decision of Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee,86 
the court described policy as a relevant consideration.87 In Sidaway v. Board 
of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & 
Others,88 the court again emphasized the need to focus on broader interests 
                                                                                                             
 83. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1975). 
 84. Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (UK). 
 85. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm. [1957] 1 WLR 582; Sidaway v. Bd. 
of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hosp. & the Maudsley Hosp. & Others 
[1985] 1 All ER 643. 
 86. Bolam, 1 WLR 582. 
 87. Id. at 586 (in consideration of the social utility of the provision of medical 
treatment). 
 88. Sidaway, 1 All ER 643. 
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than one patient represents, along with the policy demand to avoid the 
practice of defensive medicine, which could potentially cripple medical 
advancement.89 These decisions considered the duty to warn of risks 
inherent in medical treatment. The conclusions reflected a policy decision 
that the imposition of an onerous duty to warn would create an overly 
cautious medical professional, unwilling to advance or try new treatment.90 
Bolitho v. City Hackney and Health Authority91 completed this triumvirate 
of cases and acted to reinforce the doctor-centric policy base of earlier 
decisions, thus preparing the ground for the emphatically policy-driven 
decision of Chester. 
In the difficult decision of Chester, the House of Lords openly 
embraced policy as a driving consideration in similar decisions.92 The 
problem with this approach is that although the Lords referred to and relied 
upon policy, it was not the same policy. In the view of Lord Bingham, the 
appropriate policy consideration was the underlying purpose of negligence 
law as a whole,93 but the majority looked to the underlying ethos of the 
duty to warn of risks inherent in medical treatment.94 In yet another 
approach, Lord Steyn struggled to fit the inquiry into the existing 
negligence framework and application of the “but for test.” This resulted 
in an unconvincing conclusion based on the reduced likelihood of a small 
risk materializing if the operation delayed.95 The poorly articulated 
reference to policy considerations was, in reality, a reflection of the 
significant role of values as outlined above.96  
In the Australian decisions, the courts did not openly embrace policy 
considerations, but they nevertheless form a basis for much of the judicial 
reasoning in the more difficult decisions under consideration. The High 
Court has carefully avoided openly embracing policy-based decisions. 
There is a consistent endeavor to place the negligence discussion within a 
setting of principle, but the court often returns to the significance of 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. ¶ 17 (Lord Diplock). 
 90. Bolam, 1 WLR 582; Sidaway, 1 All ER 643. 
 91. Bolitho v. City Hackney and Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
 92. “But the issue of causation cannot be separated from issues about policy.” 
Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41 [85] (Lord Steyn). 
 93. Id. ¶ 7. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 11, 22. 
 95. This reasoning is flawed because it is based on a “lightning never strikes 
twice” principle: a small risk materialized at this time, therefore it will not 
materialize at another time. See also id. ¶¶ 11 (Lord Steyn), 31 (Lord Hoffman) 
(Lord Hoffman’s discussion of the Casino rationale and Lord Steyn’s subsequent 
application of this rationale). 
 96. See supra Fig. 1. 
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broader normative considerations such as values or policy,97 
acknowledging that the issues under consideration do not always sit 
comfortably within the existing framework. At times, courts expressly 
acknowledge the role of values, but it is always with some reluctance.98 
Courts take care to place any statement of values firmly within the 
framework of principle.  
In Chappel,99 the High Court aimed for a principled approach to the 
law and avoided the language of policy, opting instead for the “common 
sense test” developed in March v. Stramare.100 The common sense test, 
however, necessarily involves the introduction of value judgments, which 
is reflected in the analysis of the judgment.101 When one scrutinizes the 
judicial application of the concept of common sense, it reveals individual 
and often idiosyncratic interpretations of what constitutes both “common” 
and “sense.”  Thus, although courts do not employ “policy” as a term, 
similar considerations as those found in the decisions from the United 
Kingdom, which specifically refer to policy considerations, drive the 
underlying process.102 These policy considerations range from views of 
the purpose of negligence law as a whole to individual interpretations of 
what is just and right in the particular circumstances. As demonstrated 
above, underpinning all of this is the values framework; despite specific 
references to policy and principle, individual values drive the conclusions.  
Later decisions overtly acknowledge the role of individual values as 
expressed in policy considerations, indicating that something more than a 
strict application of principle can drive judicial decision-making 
processes. Elbourne v. Gibbs103 acknowledges this role when, following 
an analysis of post-Chappel decisions, Basten J.A. emphasized that 
establishing the principles of causation in tort law must “satisfy the policy 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Travel Comp. Fund v. Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627, 639 
(Gleeson CJ) (Austl.). 
 98. For examples of overt values discussion, see Montgomery v. Lanarkshire 
Health Bd. [2015] UKSC 11; Aintree Univ. Hosps. NHS Found. Tr. v. James 
[2013] UKSC 67. 
 99. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (Austl.). 
 100. March v. Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 (this would now involve 
consideration and application of the relevant legislative provision). 
 101. See supra Fig. 1. 
 102. See, e.g., Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [21]. Lord Steyn refers to 
the consideration in Chappel as a decision between two policy considerations. 
“This Australian case reveals two fundamentally different approaches, the one 
favouring firm adherence to traditionalist causation techniques and the other a 
greater emphasis on policy and corrective justice.” Id. 
 103. Elbourne v. Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127 (Austl.). 
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underlying the legal attribution of responsibility.”104 Similarly, in Dr. 
Ibrahim v. Arkell,105 Fitzgerald JA noted106 that “the policy requirement 
entitling a competent person to make his or her own decisions about his or 
her life” drives these decisions.107 
Thus, the broad notion of policy, which serves to preserve the rigor of 
the law, appears alongside a narrower, individual needs-based policy 
aimed at preserving the personal integrity of the plaintiff-patient. This 
thought presents several questions regarding the dominant policy 
consideration, how it is formed, and how potentially conflicting policies 
may be reconciled. The inability to answer these questions with any 
certainty lies at the heart of the argument that objective, externally driven 
concerns do not drive these decisions, but rather by an internal set of 
values that are given expression in the language of policy drives the 
decisions. 
The role of policy is, therefore, to lend flexibility to the judicial 
decision-making process. The problem with the breadth of the term 
“policy,” is that judges employ it to appeal to some apparently external 
measure used as a calculation of the decision reached. There is no 
consistency or clarity surrounding the term—policy can dictate opposing 
conclusions. Policy is thus a flexible term best viewed as the means by 
which judges are able to address the complexities presented by “[t]he 
whole confused, shifting helter-skelter of life parades before [them].”108 In 
short, the nature of the issues that come before the courts call for a 
willingness to be flexible, an application of a clear mix of established legal 
tests, and the more loosely defined considerations collectively labeled 
“policy.” Judges apply this process with a liberal hand as in the decisions 
outlined above.109 
An inflexible judiciary would result in injustice and deny the very 
nature of humanity that seeks resolution through the application of the law. 
Courts must balance the need for flexibility, however, against the need for 
coherent law. Although basing judicial conclusions upon individual 
statements of “broad values . . . [may well be] beguiling,”110 it is 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. ¶ 74. 
 105. Dr. Ibrahim v. Arkell [1999] NSWCA 95 (Austl.). 
 106. As Chappel addressed the question of pre-treatment advice, this 
discussion focuses on decisions addressing the same legal issue.  
 107. Dr. Ibrahim, NSWCA 95 ¶ 33. 
 108. FRANK, supra note 1, at 6.  
 109. See generally Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (UK); Chappel v. Hart 
(1998) 195 CLR 232 (Austl.). 
 110. Cattanach v. Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 ¶ 77 (McHugh & Gummow JJ) 
(Austl.). 
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“misleading simplicity”111 and unlikely to result in the development of 
coherent law. 
VI. SEEKING COHERENCE AND CONCLUSION 
The overarching problem is the potential for a lack of coherence and 
transparency. Judges employ the term “policy” in the words of McHugh 
and Gummow ACJ, to “glide to [a] conclusion,”112 based upon 
individually formed assumptions of what is appropriate in the 
circumstances. Judges employ this device when the chaos of human 
relations collides with apparently rigid legal principles. In this way, policy 
may serve to mask the true nature of judicial reasoning. 
Although it is easy to refer simply to the notion of policy, it is 
exceedingly difficult to give it specific content. As Francis Bennion 
pointed out, “the content of public policy (and therefore legal policy) is 
what the Court thinks and says it is.”113 In the absence of clear and 
consistent content, reasoning based upon policy cannot provide clarity or 
certainty in the law. To appeal to policy is to appeal to uncertain, 
individual notions of what is a fair result in the specific circumstances 
before the court. Such an appeal represents a departure from “the path of 
merely logical deduction [and one] lose[s] the illusion of certainty.”114 It 
is from certainty and consistency that confidence in the law grows. 
Assuredly, a call for certainty does not connote a call for a concrete or 
inflexible law. Indeed, the law must remain inherently flexible, as it is not, 
and ought not be, a machine.115 Flexibility, however, does not generate 
incoherent or opaque—as opposed to transparent—law. Rather, flexibility 
creates a system that is able to shift and change with the needs and 
expectations of society. 
The law must evolve, and society must acknowledge this evolution. 
To appeal to policy as though it were a concrete and fixed notion is to deny 
the nature of the law and conceal the true rationale underlying the decision. 
The problem here lies in the absence of clarity. Justice Kirby in Cattanach 
v. Melchior explains,116 “[I]f the application of ordinary legal principles is 
to be denied on the basis of public policy, it is essential that such policy 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. F.A.R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A CODE 657 (Butterworths 
4th ed. 1997). 
 114. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1894–95). 
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be spelt out so as to be susceptible of analysis and criticism.”117 Flexibility 
of the law is not something to hide; the process of judicial decision-making 
is more than a mechanical application of rules.118 Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding the language of policy, clear advantages are associated with 
value-based decisions policy enables. Jerome Frank takes this argument 
further and argues that courts ought to openly acknowledge the flexibility, 
embrace the “unavoidably human, fallible character of the law,” and if 
society were to do this, the “retreat into policy” may not be necessary.119 
 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. ¶ 152 (Kirby J). 
 118. Id. ¶ 121. 
 119. FRANK, supra note 1. 
